Whether energy is God or God is energy concerns me very little, for how, in any case, can I know such things? But to give appropriate psychological explanationsthis I must be able to do. (C. G. Jung) 1 It is a remarkable quality of Jung's legacy that it appeals across diverse disciplines, but I put the above statement upfront as a reminder that as a therapist Jung was concerned first and foremost with explaining the kind of phenomena that clinicians confront in their patients. If a concept of energy or libido does the job, so to speak, that's more important than whether the concept is metaphysically sound or not. Nevertheless, Jung did attempt to articulate a cogent theory of what precisely psychic energy might be. His theorizing about psychic energy took off in the 1912 monograph, Psychology of the Unconscious which four decades later was lightly revised as Symbols of Transformation. 2 Seeking the appropriate psychological explanation for patients' symptoms, he argued that the Freudian notion of libido as sexual energy is inapplicable to dementia praecox since the illness is associated with the generation of a fantasy world rather than with heightened sexuality. This argument set him on a line of
3 of energy, though he conceded that 'the notion of energy, even if taken nowadays purely as a metaphor, helps to explain differences in perception.' 6 However, in contradistinction to the academic debates about mental energy early on, Jung's concept of psychic energy has seldom been examined or debated in Jungian circles despite its original centrality. First published in 1948, Esther Harding's book, Psychic Energywith a Preface by Jungis a tour-de-force of symbolism and their signification; 7 but it does not contain any definition of psychic energy. A similar observation could be made about John Beebe's recent book, Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type. 8 Beebe uses the word 'energy' liberally but in a commonsense way, as an everyday concept that requires no explanation. His theoretical investment is in the concept of psychological types. 'Psychic energy' continues to be acknowledged in textbooks as something that Jung said 9 and is the topic of scholarly publications that attempt to clarify what Jung meant and to locate his idea historically, 10 but at best we can offer fresh insights into what he was saying and why he was saying it. As a scientific or quasi-scientific explanation, this construct has lost its vitality.
This chapter revisits Jung's concept from another direction. Instead of examining its place in the intellectual history of modern psychology, I want to tease out an ancient image 4 the stream of desirethat Jung both inherits and resists when he strives to improve upon the Freudian concept: 'By libido I mean psychic energy. Psychic energy is the intensity of a psychic process, its psychological value.
[…] Neither do I understand libido as a psychic force, a misconception that has led many critics astray,' says Jung. 11 We should not be misled by the linearity of terminological succession. Jung's psychological value is not a synonym for Freud's libido but its antonym, as will be seen.
The ancient stream
There is an obvious association, a kind of continuity, between the Freudian libido and the stream-of-desire image. Dictionaries tell us that the word libido originates in the Latin for desire or lust; and there is an etymological connection to the English word love. The imaginative association between a stream and desire is explicit in the Dammapada, where it carries a moral message: 'When the thirty-six streams of desire that run towards pleasure are strong, their powerful waves carry away that man'; 'Go beyond the stream … go with all your soul: leave desires behind'. 12 In historical parallel, in Republic Plato deploys an almost identical image: 'anyone whose predilection tends strongly in a single direction has correspondingly less desire for other things, like a stream whose flow has been diverted into another channel.' 13 The same imagery flows on into psychoanalytical theory. Freud speaks of 11 Jung, Collected Works, vol. 6, Psychological Types, §778. The parts of the psyche are like channels or tubes into which the flow of a single stream is divided. The total flowage is constant, so that what goes into one tube or channel is lost to the others … Both the Republic and the Symposium suggest that this single source is eros, a primordial energy source powering not simply the stereotypically erotic activities, but all human activities whatsoever. 17 Similarly, Henry Teloh took the stream analogy in the Republic as pivotal for understanding Plato's conception of the soul as psychic energy. 18 Commenting on Teloh's paper, M.L.
Osborne contends that such interpretation is not borne out by Plato's argument in the same context. 19 I concur with Osborne.
Arguably, it is Freud who has made it possible to link Plato's stream analogy and some concept of Eros (Plato in fact presents several concepts through the various speakers in the Symposium). It is Freudnot Platowho upheld Eros, equated with sexual excitation, as universally the strongest motivating force. This claim seemed justified in view of how evolution, human biology, and energy were understood circa 1900, but it was not possible to make in Plato's time. It seems anachronistic to attribute to Plato an understanding of the Greek love-god as psychic energy. The ancients did not have the mechanistic concept of energy that underpins Freudian thinking, and by extension empowers Jung's departure from 7
Freud. The pitfalls of reading Plato through a Freudian lens may serve as a cautionary tale for seeking continuities between Jung and the classics.
Bridging Jung and ancient thought
One obvious way to bridge analytical psychology and the study of ancient thought is to approach the topic from the standpoint of Jung scholarship; that is, 'Jung' being one's subject matter. It is possible to scour the Collected Works for citations and to analyse how Jung brings those to bear on his theory building; or to interrogate the Jungian corpus for 'influences', whether acknowledged or not. As Henri Bergson averred, 'even today, we shall philosophize in the manner of the Greeks, we shall rediscover, without needing to know them, such and such of their general conclusions.' 20 However, this strategy might not take us very far regarding the topic of psychic energy.
In the 1928 essay, 21 Jung lists the following in a single sentenceand in this order as concepts that are similar to his own but only of limited overlap:
• Schopenhauer's Will insists that energy is not a force. 22 Schopenhauer distinguished Will from its phenomenal appearances, reasoning that the abstract concept of force is derived from sense perception. 23 But unless we delve into Schopenhauer's system of thought, this comparison can backfire, so to speak. Schopenhauer's concept does not imply freedom to control one's behaviour (o willpower). Bergson is at the bottom of Jung's list perhaps because Jung repeatedly fended off his own critics who accused him of vitalism, hence he was not keen to associate his concept with élan vital. In the present context, the main point is that the Greeks are merely sandwiched between the two modern philosophers.
The link that Jung ultimately makesor the bridge he buildsis across modernity and so-called 'primitive' mentality. A few paragraphs before the aforementioned list he states that 'energy is an immediate, a priori, intuitive idea,' concludes in a related footnote that 'therefore the idea of it is as old as humanity' and proceeds to discuss the Melanesian concept and indirectly to reinforce the orientation with the unus mundus premise he extrapolated from medieval alchemy. Ultimately the invocation of those (or any) cosmologies is incommensurable with his definition of energy as psychological valuea concept that refers to the meaning that something has for someone. Remember that whether energy is God or God is energy concerned him very little. In terms of a psychological explanation, the tensions that come to light at this juncture gravitate towards the ancient metaphysical problem of universals. It is a problematic throughout modern psychology, but in the context of Jungianism it manifests in a tendency to abstract psychological universals, such as archetypes, from an aggregate of particular instances (myths, fairytales, patients' dreams, etc.) that at best share a family resemblance; and then to concretise the abstract construct as if it were a causal factor, saying that these instances occur because of the archetypal configuration.
Enter the machine
What Jung and the ancients do not have in common can be conveyed, again, with the aid of Bergson, namely that 'ancient science applied to concepts, while modern science seeks laws.' 25 Unlike the Dhammapada, which instructs how to live virtuously, both Freud and Jung inform us why we live as we do, vice and virtue alike. In modernity the stream analogy merges into a mechanistic metaphor of energy as a motivating force. The stream becomes steam power. Concepts of mental energy, libido and so forth, were invented so as to account for how the psyche works. It is (or was) commonly assumed that some form of energy powers the intrapsychic machinery in accordance with natural laws; and those laws have to 25 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 333. 11 be discovered and articulated. Consequently, debates during the first half of the last century centred on what is the appropriate conceptualisation.
Jung entered the intellectual arena with a contention that previous definitions (not only Freud's) were mistaken because they confused energy with a substance:
The idea of energy is not that of substance moved in space, it is a concept abstracted from relations of movement. The concept, therefore, is founded not on the substances themselves but on their relations, whereas the moving substance itself is the basis of the mechanistic view. 26 Jung thus pitches two approaches against each other. According to the causal-mechanistic view (which he contests), energy is synonymous with a force or a drive. It is conceptualised as substance-like, a 'thing' that causes movements in the psyche. We may imagine, for instance, the water that makes the watermill turn (my metaphor). This posits the existence of energy as a precondition for psychological phenomena, just as water must exist before the watermill can do its work. In opposition to the causal-mechanistic view, Jung articulates what he calls the 'energic' or interchangeably the 'final' view, which removes the arrow of causality. It puts the phenomena first, arguing that intrapsychic movements (which already exist) can be expressed in terms of an energy quantum. By analogy, we are looking at the energy that the watermill produces by virtue of its operation (while the causal-mechanistic position confuses the force of the flowing water for the energy that the watermill produces).
The word 'final' has connotations of teleological, which Jung himself contested. The 12 epistemological position that he endorses is best called a functional approach. 27 Such approach identifies how something functions within the whole of the person's psychological processes. It does not necessarily oppose the machine metaphor, for we may compare it to describing the function of a cog in a machine, i.e. how this element is necessary for the machine's capacity for doing its work (to paraphrase the commonplace definition of energy in physics).
The energic/final/functional approach does not eliminate the epistemological necessity of explaining how movements in the psyche are caused. Jung does not reject causal explanations per se, but objects to regarding energy as a causal factor. He brings together causality and functionality, for instance, when attributing the formation of symbols to a situation where a conflict between two mutually incompatible subjective states generates psychological tension that is eventually transcended through the formation of a new symbol:
The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living thing, a third thing […] a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. 28 The new symbol constitutes a new objectnot merely a token for something repressed (contra Freud), but something with its own meaning or aura of meaningfulness. Its energy quantum is its psychological value, evident in the intensity and direction of affect, for 'psychological value […] does not imply an assignment of value, whether moral, aesthetic, or 27 See Jones, 'Psychological value and symbol formation', p. 239 ff.
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intellectual; the psychological value is already implicit in its determining power, which expresses itself in definite psychic effects'. 29
Conclusion
We cannot step into the same stream twice. As seen, some scholars who step into Plato's stream analogy after Freud see reflections of Eros there and are inclined to redefine Plato's Eros as a primordial energy source powering human activities. How should we step into the stream after Jung? His reformulation of the libido does not write off the stream analogy, but alters its application. Jung's 1928 essay labours towards a concept of dynamism as an abstract property of the psyche in the sense that 'flow' is a property of a stream. With Freud we would see libido like seeing the 'behaviour' of water when standing outside a stream: libido is channelled, blocked, diverted, or dispersed unequally across various channels.
Following Jung, we may imagine ourselves like a grain of sand carried by its torrent, experiencing it from within, and should ask what it 'feels like' to be caught in the turbulence.
Jung insists that his own task, what he must be able to do, is to give an appropriate psychological explanation. However, explanatory constructs in psychology come and go alike intellectual fashions though every new fashion is heralded as a scientific paradigm shift and therefore as progress. Walter Benjamin has given a vivid characterisation of the concept of progress in his meditation on a painting by Klee ('Angelus Novus'). Describing it as showing an angel 'looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating,' Benjamin mused,
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But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress. 30 In a way, Jung is like this angel when theorizing about psychic energy. He sees the debris of previous concepts, which he deconstructs and finds deficient, and cannot see the futurethe cognitive revolution in psychology of the second half of the 20th century, which has rendered concepts of mental energy obsolete and has redefined psychological explanations based on such concepts as inappropriate. However, Jung is fixated on the past not only like Benjamin's angel of history but also in that he looks to the very far distance, our evolutionary past, and finds the intuitive notion of energy as old as humanity itself.
Jung neither endorsed nor challenged the primitive and ancient cosmologies he identified as precursors of the modern 'energy' construct. Instead, he asks why human beings have these notions at all, what psychological function these might serve. Jung ends the essay on psychic energy thus:
The most universal incidence of the primitive concept of energy is a clear expression of the fact that even at early levels of human consciousness man felt the need to represent the sensed dynamism of psychic events in a concrete way. If, therefore, in our psychology we lay stress on the energic point of view, this is in accord with the psychic facts which have been graven on the mind of man since primordial times. 31 
